Talent Jumo v Katswe Sistahood Trust & Anor

### Preamble
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE
JUDGMENT NO LC/H/239/2025
HARARE, 27TH FEBRUARY 2025
CASE NO LC/H/927/24
LC/H/926/24
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IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE	JUDGMENT NO LC/H/239/2025

HARARE, 27TH FEBRUARY 2025	CASE NO LC/H/927/24 LC/H/926/24

AND 4TH JULY, 2025

TALENT JUMO	APPLICANT

AND

KATSWE SISTAHOOD TRUST	1st RESPONDENT AND

BLESSING DIZA	2nd RESPONDENT

Before the Honourable Chivizhe, Judge:

For Appellant/ Applicant	-	Adv. R. Mabwe

For Respondent	-	Mr A. Dracos (Legal Practitioner)

CHIVIZHE, J:

This is a combined application for review in terms of Section 92EE as read with Rule 20 of the Labour Court Rules, 2017 of the internal disciplinary proceedings held against the Applicant and an appeal in terms of Section 92D as read with Section 92E of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] read together with Rule 19 of the Labour Court Rules, 2017.against the determination handed down on the 9th of August 2024.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The matter before this Court concerns a combined appeal and review application arising from the dismissal of the Appellant/Applicant from her position of employment within the 1st Respondent Trust. The Appellant is one of the founders and a trustee of the 1st Respondent, a

registered trust. On the 24th of April 2024, the Applicant/Appellant was served with a suspension letter, which marked the commencement of disciplinary proceedings against her. Subsequent to her suspension, the Applicant/Appellant was formally charged with 14 counts of misconduct, spanning allegations of financial impropriety, gross negligence, and breaches of internal policy frameworks, particularly the Human Resources Policy Manual and financial controls governing the Trust.

Under Counts 1 and 2, the Applicant/Appellant was accused of unilaterally increasing her monthly salary from USD 2,000 to USD 7,500 in 2021, and further to USD 12,980 for the period extending to April 2024, without approval from the board. Similarly, she allegedly approved salary increases for the Finance Manager, escalating their salary from USD $1,200 to USD $5,000 over the same period. These actions allegedly prejudiced the Trust by USD 480,480 by the end of December 2023. Furthermore, part of her salary was reportedly paid into a personal Botswana account and the remainder in cash, with no tax remitted.

Under counts 3 to 5, it was alleged that during her tenure, 14 employees worked without valid employment contracts, and discrepancies were noted in salary payments under her direction, amounting to USD $28,535.22. In addition, pay slips were not issued, and irregular withdrawals from a Botswana-based Ford Foundation account totaling USD $131,010 were reported, with only partial accountability for the funds.

Under counts 6 and 7, the Applicant/Appellant was accused of forging cash requisitions amounting to USD 360,325 using the names of six staff members. She was further alleged to have made 126 cash withdrawals from the Trust’s administration account totaling USD

$483,346, with no supporting documentation such as payment vouchers.

Under counts 8 to 12, the Applicant/Appellant allegedly awarded contracts to suppliers without following prescribed tender procedures, including overpaying Mass Construction by over USD 71,000 beyond the fixed contract price without board authority or proper documentation. A payment of USD 6,700 to a furniture supplier was also flagged, where no goods were delivered, and a forged signature appeared on the requisition form. In another instance, she allegedly withdrew USD 14,000 from the ICAD Botswana account, which remains unaccounted for. There were also irregularities in car hire reimbursements.

Under count 13 and 14, an analysis of withdrawals from the Northern Tobacco account allegedly made by the Applicant/Appellant showed unsupported disbursements amounting to USD $101,410.

Upon receipt of the suspension letter, the Applicant/Appellant requested further particulars but received no response. A disciplinary hearing was convened before the 2nd

Respondent. The Applicant/Appellant raised jurisdictional objections and procedural concerns on the hearing date but was overruled. She participated in parts of the hearing, filing written submissions and presenting arguments. However, she later walked out of the proceedings prior to conclusion. The 2nd Respondent proceeded in her absence, found her guilty on various counts, and recommended dismissal. The Appellant was accordingly dismissed from her position. The Appellant now challenges the procedural fairness and substantive basis of her dismissal through a combined appeal and review before this Court.

GROUNDS OF REVIEW

2nd Respondent being the Disciplinary Authority, did not have jurisdiction to preside over the Disciplinary Proceedings on account of having been appointed by an entity (the purported Executive Board) that is not the Applicant's employer and had no authority to do so.

There were irregularities in the proceedings in that;

I was not furnished with any of the particulars I requested for the purposes of preparing my defence and was thus denied adequate facilities within which to prepare my defence. I was thus denied a fair hearing.

I was denied, on two occasions, a copy of the record which I needed to enable me to engage alternate legal counsel and proceed with the matter.

My legal practitioner (Ms. M.P Mamimine) was denied a postponement when she sought one for the purposes of enabling her to adequately prepare for the hearing.

I raised several objections that were not addressed in the determination made against me.

I attached various evidentiary material that was not considered at all in coming up with the determination.

WHEREFORE, the Applicant prays for an order in the following terms:

That the application for review succeeds with costs.

That the proceedings held against the Applicant and presided over by the 2nd Respondent which culminated in Applicant's termination of employment on the 9th of August 2024 be and are hereby set aside in their entirety.

The matter is remitted back for hearing de novo before a differently and properly constituted Disciplinary Authority within 60 days of this order, only if the 1st Respondent is willing to restart the disciplinary process against Applicant

IN LIMIINE

The Respondents raised the following points in limine in their heads;

The Applicant improperly cited the 1st Respondent by citing a trust, which lacks juristic personality and therefore cannot be sued or cited in its own name.

The Applicant waived the right to challenge the Default Judgment as the Applicant exited the hearing without the 2nd Respondent’s leave, resulting in a default ruling;

On the first point in limine, the Respondents contended that the 1st Respondent has been improperly cited, as the Applicant cited a trust by name, which is not a legal persona. They relied on Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 (3) SA 833 (A) at 840, where it was held that a trust is not a juristic person and that its assets and liabilities vest in its trustees. Additional reliance was placed on Veritas v ZEC & Others SC 103/20 and Women & Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust v Shongwe & Ors HH 202/03, which reaffirm the principle that a trust, per se, cannot sue or be sued.

In response, the Applicant submitted that while the common law does not recognise trusts as legal persons, this position has been modified by procedural rules. Specifically, the Applicant referred to Order 2 Rule 8 and Rule 7 of the High Court Rules, 2021, which permit trusts to be cited in their own name. In support the Applicant cited Benatar Children’s Trust HH 124/17 and Chitiga & Ors v Matsikidze N.O. & Ors [2021] ZWMSVHC 58. The Applicant also invoked the principle of estoppel, arguing that the trust conducted the employment relationship and disciplinary proceedings under its own name and cannot now disavow that identity, citing Aris Enterprises v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1981 (3) SA 274 (A).

It is indeed a settled principle of our law that a trust is not a “person” in the legal sense. Unlike a company or individual, a trust cannot stand as a litigant on its own; it must act through its trustee or trustees, who carry the rights and obligations in representative capacities. As stated in MacNeillie’s Estate supra and affirmed by our courts;

“neither our authorities nor our courts have recognised [a trust] as such a persona or entity…it is trite law that the assets and liabilities in a trust vest in the trustee.”

Likewise, the Supreme Court in Veritas v Zimbabwe Electoral Commission SC 103/20 confirmed that a trust, in that case, “Veritas” trading as a trust, lacks legal personality of its own and cannot litigate in its nom de plume absent the proper citation of the trust’s name or its trustees. Although a trust lacks juristic personality at common law, the procedural rules under Order 2 Rule 8 of the High Court Rules, 2021 permit a trust to be cited eo nomine for convenience. This modification, carried forward from the 1971 Rules, treats the trust name as a collective designation of the trustees, without conferring separate legal personality. Our courts have endorsed this departure from the strict common law in Benatar Children’s Trust v

Robert Daniel Benatar HH 124-17 and Gold Mining & Minerals Development Trust v Zimbabwe Miners Federation 2006 (1) ZLR 174 (H), where it was held that citation by trust name is permissible so long as the trustees are functionally represented. In the present case, the first Respondent styled itself as “the employer” in all internal proceedings and disciplinary records, and participated without objection under that name. It is now estopped from denying its identity as was the position in Aris Enterprises v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1981 (3) SA 274

(A). There is no suggestion that a fictitious or unrelated entity was cited. As the trust is properly represented, the objection to its citation is a technical one without merit. As reaffirmed in Veritas v ZEC supra, even where a citation error occurs, amendment is permitted, but no such amendment is necessary here. Accordingly, the Court finds that the trust is properly before it and the point in limine is dismissed.

On the 2nd point in limine, the Respondents contended that the Applicant walked out of the disciplinary hearing without leave, resulting in a default judgment. They argued that by doing so, the Applicant waived the right to be heard and consequently forfeited the right to challenge the outcome. Reliance was placed on Hombarume v ZIMRA SC 20/14, Moyo v Rural Electrification Agency SC 4/14, and Pacprint (Pvt) Ltd v Kumbula & Ors SC 67/17, where the courts held that a party who deliberately absents themselves from a hearing cannot later seek to impugn it.The Applicant opposed the second point in limine, maintaining that the disciplinary hearing was not a default proceeding. She submitted that she participated by actively filing submissions, attending sessions, cross-examining witnesses, and presenting mitigation, only leaving at a later stage.

The proposition advanced by the Respondent is strongly supported in our law. Our superior courts have consistently held that an employee who deliberately absents himself from a disciplinary inquiry or hearing waives the right to later challenge the conduct or result of those proceedings. This principle was perhaps most clearly articulated in Moyo v Rural Electrification Agency SC 4/14 and Hombarume v ZIMRA SC 20/14. In Moyo supra, the Supreme Court per Ziyambi JA found that an Appellant who “deliberately absented himself without leave from the hearing, waived his right to challenge the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings” . The Court emphasized that the employee had the option to seek a postponement or otherwise engage with the process but chose not to, thus he could not later fault the process for continuing in his absence . Likewise, in Hombarume and in St John’s Educational Trust v Gardner SC 26/08, the courts reiterated that where a party willfully refuses to attend a hearing, he cannot be heard to complain about the procedure or outcome. On the facts, the waiver

principle squarely applies. The Applicant deliberately walked out of the disciplinary hearing, thereby waiving the right to be heard and to later challenge either the procedure or outcome. This mirrors the conduct addressed in Pacprint (Pvt) Ltd v Kumbula & Ors SC 67/17, where the Supreme Court held that parties who boycott hearings cannot later invoke review processes, as the law does not tolerate such prevarication. Similarly, in Hombarume v ZIMRA SC 20/14 and Moyo v Rural Electrification Agency SC 4/14, it was held that a party who absents themselves forfeits the right to assert procedural rights thereafter. The Applicant’s attempt to rely on the Respondent’s failure to file the disciplinary record under Rule 20(2)(f) of the Labour Court Rules, 2017 is unavailing. While the record is ordinarily essential to a review as stated in S v Davy 1988 (1) ZLR 386; S v Mazambani [2012] ZWHHC 449), its absence here cannot revive rights already waived. As emphasized in Moyo, waiver is a threshold bar, once established, it forecloses the Court’s ability to assess procedural irregularities that could have been raised had the Applicant participated. Accordingly, the second point in limine is upheld, and the review application, having no foundation, is dismissed in limine.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself on the facts amounting to a misdirection of law in ascribing to Appellant duties, that had not been proved by way of established evidence. 3/106 357/868

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, without referring to any provision in any contract or other policy of the Respondent, that salary increments had to be approved by the Board and that the Board had not approved the salary increments.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that the onus had shifted to back to the Appellant to demonstrate that she did not violate the contract’s terms when the terms of the contract were never pleaded, alleged or proved.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant had failed to rebut the employer’s claims that the responsibility for tax remissions lay with the Finance Manager when the Disciplinary Authority had been referred to specific policy provisions stating so. Put differently, the The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, in finding Appellant guilty of conduct that is reserved for the Finance Manager, a position she did not, terms of the applicable policies and procedures.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that the Appellant had the duty to ensure proper documentation and was the overseer of the day to day affairs of the Trust when no evidence to this effect was placed before it. At any rate, the Deed of Trust reposes this function to a separate entity and there was no evidence that the said entity had delegated its powers or functions to the Appellant.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant was 4/106 358/868 grossly negligent, a charge that was never preferred against her. At any rate, it was not established by way of evidence, that Appellant bore the ultimate responsibility for management an oversight of the organization’s financial affairs. This responsibility is assigned to a separate entity by the Deed of Trust.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant bore the onus to providing supporting documentation explaining the discrepancy with respect allegedly missing funds and yet the duty to keep proper financial records lies with the Finance manager in terms of the applicable policy documents.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant bore the responsibility of verifying authenticity of signatures without any evidence of that sort having been led during the hearing.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant bore the onus to substantiate the inaccuracy of the withdrawn amounts when it was not shown that she had actually made the withdrawals in question let alone failed to account for when the audit report confirms that all amounts withdrawn by Appellant were surrendered to and received by the Finance Manager.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Respondent failed to present formal documentation and relied on WhatsApp conversations. This finding ignores the emails exchanged between the relative parties. 5/106 359/868

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant did not dispute absence of supporting documentation for payments made to Mats Construction. All allegations were put into issue.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that there was no delivery of office merely on account of it having been delivered at the Respondent’s project premises in Epworth and not at its Head Office. At any rate, no evidence was adduced strictly requiring delivery at the Strathaven address to the exclusion of any other premise.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that the Appellant did not offer a credible explanation for the missing funds and did not dispute the authenticity of the forged documents. All allegations were brought into issue, and at any rate, it had not been shown how Appellant had allegedly violated her contract’s terms.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant utilised car rental services from a company co-owned by her husband. This finding is contrary to established evidence.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant did not dispute the existence of conflict of interest. This finding is contrary to established evidence.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority grossly misdirected itself, in holding as it did, that Appellant did not cross examine on two charges and consequently the offence was 6/106 360/868 proved. In doing so, the Respondent disregarded, without explanation, the defences that had been tendered by the Appellant and also disregarded her unique role as an unrepresented Accused at the time.

The Respondent’s disciplinary authority erred and misdirected itself in convicting Appellant for an alleged contravention of Section 4 (a) of the Labour [National Employment Code of Conduct], Statutory Instrument 15 of 2006 when no evidence had been led to substantiate the charge.

The Respondent, through its Disciplinary Authority erred at law in seeking to reverse the onus to Appellant when no evidence had been established that she violated any of the terms of her contract of employment.

The Respondent, through, its Disciplinary Authority, misdirected itself in failing to consider any of the submissions or evidence placed before it by the Appellant, let alone give reasons for discounting those submissions or evidence.

Ad Sentence

The Respondent’s disciplinary authority erred and misdirected itself in paying lip service to the factors advanced in mitigation and placing undue weight on the points made in aggravation, which in any event had been demonstrated to be a wrong assumption on the part of the employer.

The Respondent’s disciplinary authority erred and misdirected itself in imposing a penalty that induces a sense of shock and outrage yet it had discretion to impose a more lenient penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Appellant prays for an order that;

The appeal succeeds with costs.

The determination /ruling of the Respondent’s Disciplinary Authority is set aside and substituted with the following;

The Employee is Found Not Guilty and is acquitted of all charges.

The Appellant be and is hereby re-instated to her position without loss of salary and benefits with effect from 9 August 2024. In the event that reinstatement is no longer tenable, Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement. Parties to negotiate damages in lieu of reinstatement, failing agreement either party to approach this court for qualification of damages in lieu of reinstatement.

IN LIMIINE

The Respondent raised the following points in limine in their heads;

There is no proper appeal before the court because the Appellant seeks to appeal against a default judgment, which has not been rescinded.

The Appellant waived the right to challenge the Determination as the Applicant exited the hearing without the Respondent’s leave, resulting in a default ruling;

The Appellant improperly cited the Respondent by citing a trust, which lacks juristic personality and therefore cannot be sued or cited in its own name.

The Appellant seeks to set aside the entire decision yet does not challenge several counts on which she was convicted. This renders the appeal defective.

The grounds of appeal are overly broad and not drawn with the required precision and conciseness as required under Rule 19(1)(a) and Form LC 4 of the Labour Court Rules, 2017.

The Respondent submitted on the 1st and 2nd point in limine that there is no valid appeal before the court as the Appellant seeks, firstly, to challenge a default judgment which has not been set aside secondly, that the Appellant in any event waived her right to be heard when she walked out of proceedings. With regards the first point in limine reliance was placed on Zvinavashe v Ndlovu SC 40/06, Parkham Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd v Adhesive Products Manufacturers (Pvt) Ltd SC 100/21 and Katritsis v De Macedo 1966 (1) SA 613. The principle from these cases is that one cannot appeal against a judgment granted in default; the appropriate remedy is rescission before the same forum. The Appellant argued that the judgment was not entered in default. She participated in proceedings by filing submissions, conducting cross- examination and submitting mitigation. The Appellant contended that even if the judgment was in default, special circumstances exist warranting the court’s indulgence. Reference was made to Guoxing Gong v Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd SC 2/17 and section 2A of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] which promotes the disposal of matters on the merits. The legal position on the issue of a judgement granted in default is well settled. A litigant cannot appeal or seek a review in such circumstances. The Zvinavashe vs Ndhlovu judgement has been aptly referred by the Respondent.

In Moyo v Rural Electrification Agency SC 4/14, the Supreme Court held that an employee who deliberately absents themselves from a disciplinary hearing without cause or leave, effectively waives the right to challenge either the procedure or the outcome. A similar principle was affirmed in Hombarume v ZIMRA SC 20/14 and St John’s Educational Trust v Gardner SC 26/08, where it was held that one cannot elect to disengage from proceedings and later invoke judicial remedies to set aside a decision made in their absence. In Pacprint (Pvt) Ltd v Kumbula & Ors SC 67/17, the Court went further, holding that employees who boycott hearings entirely are disentitled from later invoking review, as this would amount to approbating and reprobating, a practice not countenanced at law. Accordingly, the 1st and 2nd points in limine are upheld.

On the 3rd point in limine, the Respondent contended that the appeal is fatally defective because a trust is not a juristic person and thus cannot be cited eo nomine. Reference was made to Commissioner for Inland Revenue v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 (3) SA 833 (A), Women and Law in Southern Africa v Elizabeth Shongwe HH 202/03, and Veritas v ZEC SC 103/20. The Appellant submitted that citation of trusts in their own name is permissible under Rule 7 of the High Court Rules, 2021 and Rule 8 of Order 2. These rules permit unincorporated associations, including trusts, to sue and be sued eo nomine. Cases such as Benatar Children’s Trust v

Benatar HH 124/17, Gold Mining Trust v Zimbabwe Miners Federation 2006 (1) ZLR 174 (H), and Chitiga v Matsikidze & Others [2021] ZWMSVHC 58 were cited in support. The Appellant also invoked estoppel, citing Tian Ze Tobacco v Chihwai [2023] ZWHHC 133, asserting that the Respondent had styled itself as the employer and could not now deny its identity.

It is indeed a settled principle of our law that a trust is not a “person” in the legal sense. Unlike a company or individual, a trust cannot stand as a litigant on its own; it must act through its trustee or trustees, who carry the rights and obligations in representative capacities. As stated in MacNeillie’s Estate supra and affirmed by our courts;

“neither our authorities nor our courts have recognised [a trust] as such a persona or entity…it is trite law that the assets and liabilities in a trust vest in the trustee.”

Likewise, the Supreme Court in Veritas v Zimbabwe Electoral Commission SC 103/20 confirmed that a trust, in that case, “Veritas” trading as a trust, lacks legal personality of its own and cannot litigate in its nom de plume absent the proper citation of the trust’s name or its trustees. Although a trust lacks juristic personality at common law, the procedural rules under Order 2 Rule 8 of the High Court Rules, 2021 permit a trust to be cited eo nomine for convenience. This modification, carried forward from the 1971 Rules, treats the trust name as a collective designation of the trustees, without conferring separate legal personality. Our courts have endorsed this departure from the strict common law in Benatar Children’s Trust v Robert Daniel Benatar HH 124-17 and Gold Mining & Minerals Development Trust v Zimbabwe Miners Federation 2006 (1) ZLR 174 (H), where it was held that citation by trust name is permissible so long as the trustees are functionally represented. In the present case, the first Respondent styled itself as “the employer” in all internal proceedings and disciplinary records, and participated without objection under that name. It is now estopped from denying its identity as was the position in Aris Enterprises v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1981 (3) SA 274

(A). There is no suggestion that a fictitious or unrelated entity was cited. As the trust is properly represented, the objection to its citation is a technical one without merit. As reaffirmed in Veritas v ZEC supra, even where a citation error occurs, amendment is permitted, but no such amendment is necessary here. Accordingly, the Court finds that the trust is properly before it and the 3rd point in limine is dismissed.

On the 4th point in limine, the Respondent argued that the Appellant failed to challenge several counts of misconduct, and thus the appeal cannot be sustained as an appeal against the whole decision. They relied on Freezewell v Bard Real Estate SC 61/03, Ndlovu v Ndlovu SC

133/02, and Matanhire v BP Shell Marketing SC 113/04. The Appellant submitted that grounds 17 to 19 of her notice of appeal are cross-cutting and relate to all counts, effectively appealing the entire determination.

The issue raised is whether the Appellant’s notice of appeal is materially defective for failing to challenge all counts upon which her dismissal was based, thereby rendering the appeal incomplete or incompetent. In principle, while an Appellant may appeal only part of a decision, where a single indivisible penalty such as dismissal is imposed for multiple charges, an appeal that omits to contest any serious count may be ineffectual, since even one unchallenged finding could independently sustain the dismissal. However, upon examining the content of the appeal, the Court finds that the Appellant challenges the overall fairness, evidentiary basis, and proportionality of the dismissal, indicating that the intention is to dispute the outcome in its entirety. Though the grounds could have been more precisely drafted, they substantively seek reinstatement and thus implicate all findings leading to dismissal. The Labour court being a court of equity is reluctant to strike appeals on technical grounds where the substance of the challenge is discernible and no prejudice arises. Accordingly, this point in limine is dismissed.

On the 5th point in limine, the Respondent contended that the grounds of appeal were vague and lacked the conciseness required under Rule 19(1)(a) and Form LC4 of the Labour Court Rules. The Appellant submitted that the Respondent did not specify which grounds were defective. Citing Sambaza v Al Shams Global SC 3/18, she submitted that valid grounds must be considered even if some are defective and that defective grounds can be struck out or amended without invalidating the entire appeal.

Form Labour Court 4 of the Labour Court Rules, 2017, echoing Rule 32 of the Supreme Court Rules, requires that grounds of appeal be “clearly and concisely” stated. As confirmed in Master v Turner SC 77/93, prolix or argumentative grounds offend this rule. Each ground must be brief yet comprehensive, not a substitute for heads of argument. While the Appellant’s notice in this case includes lengthy and detailed grounds, some resembling narratives or legal submissions, the Court finds that they are still intelligible and sufficiently disclose the essence of the complaint being procedural unfairness, factual and legal misdirections and a disproportionate penalty. The Respondent clearly understood and responded to the issues, indicating no prejudice arose. Though the drafting could have been more succinct, the Court adopts an equitable approach consistent with this courts preference for substance over form, particularly where no prejudice is shown. As held in River Ranch Ltd v Delta Corporation HH

1/10, prolixity may be cured by trimming or striking out portions rather than invalidating the appeal. Accordingly, this point in limine is dismissed.

EVALUATION

The upholding of the second point in limine on both the review application and appeal is dispositive of both matters. The Applicant/ Appellant having walked out of disciplinary proceedings waived her right to challenge the disciplinary outcome and the proceeding. She also is in no position to challenge a default judgement rendered against. In the circumstances both the appeal and review application cannot proceed on the merits.

It be and is hereby ordered that;

The application for review under case no. LC/H/927/24 and the appeal under case no. LC/H926/24 be and are hereby dismissed in limine.

No order as to costs.