Muchineripi Zimbovora v The Audit Office & 3 Others

### Preamble
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE
JUDGMENT NO. LC/H/48/22
HELD AT HARARE ON 24TH JANUARY, 2022
CASE
JUDGMENT NO. LC/H/48/2022
CASE NO. LC/H/APP/349/20
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IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE	            JUDGMENT NO. LC/H/48/22

HELD AT HARARE ON 24TH JANUARY, 2022      CASE NO.LC/H/APP/349/20

AND 25TH FEBRUARY, 2022

In the matter between:-

MUCHINERIPI ZIMBOVORA				APPLICANT

AND

THE AUDIT OFFICE					1ST RESPONDENT

AND

BONFACE MUKWENGA N.O.				2ND RESPONDENT

AND

ANYMORE GURI N.O.					3RD RESPONDENT

AND

LUXON MURURAMI N.O.				4TH RESPONDENT

Before the Honourable Makamure, J.

For the Applicant	:		Mr. R.T. Mutero (Legal Practitioner)

For the Respondent	:	Advocate B. Magogo (Legal Practitioner)

MAKAMURE J.

Introduction

[1]	This is an application for condonation for late filing of an application for review and extension of time within which to file an application for review.  It is opposed.

[2]	Before the application for condonation was argued a preliminary issue was raised on behalf of the applicant.  Parties agreed that the preliminary issue be dealt with and then proceed to argue merits of the application.  Judgment on the preliminary issue would then be considered or reserved after which the main application would then be considered.  It is trite that where a preliminary issue has been raised, it must be determined before the merits are determined.  This is the procedure to be adopted in the present matter.

I must say that I am disappointed by the rather piecemeal manner that this matter is being handled.  This appears more fully below.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

[3]	The preliminary point raised on behalf of the applicant is that the 1st respondent’s opposing affidavit has a computer generated date.  The averment is that since the date was computer generated it could not have been inserted by the deponent.  Further the averment continued, the commissioning is wholly done by the Commissioner of Oaths and the same must endorse the date.  In view of this, it was submitted that the affidavit in question was irregular and therefore is defective.  It was also averred that the other affidavits at pages 153-154 of the record are not dated.  For this reason they are defective.  When asked by the court as to how long he has been seized with this matter Mr. Mutero who appeared for the applicant indicated that it was from “sometime in 2020.”

[4]	In response Mr. Magogo who appeared for the respondent averred that these same affidavits were used in the form that they are in right now particularly in an appeal which this court determined .  In the appeal matter, judgment was passed. This court dismissed the applicant’s (then appellant) appeal.  By raising the impropriety of the affidavits as is being done now Mr. Magogo submitted, the applicant is trying to review a judgment of this court which judgment was handed down in June 2020.  At that time applicant did not raise issue with the affidavits.  In any event if the affidavit was irregular, the applicant has acquiesced with the position.  As such he is estopped from taking advantage of it as he waived his right to challenge the propriety of the affidavit or affidavits.  Further, Mr. Magogo argued, there is no statute regulating the commissioning of affidavits.  In the event therefore that the affidavit was irregular, that would not lead to invalidity.  Reliance was placed on the case of S v HURLE & OTHERS 1998 (2) ZLR 34.

[5]	The position is, Mr. Magogo submitted, that once an affidavit has been commissioned, there is a presumption of regularity.  Mr. Magogo drew the court’s attention to the fact that the very same date that the affidavits were commissioned is also the date that they were filed with the Registrar.  Further there was no evidence produced to show that the date (9th December 2020) was not entered or inserted by the Commissioner of Oaths.  For that reason it was submitted that the preliminary point should fail.

[6]	In assessing this preliminary issue, and as I have pointed out from the onset, I am concerned with finality to litigation and the manner the parties are dealing with this matter.  On 30 May 2021 this same application condonation was stalled because a preliminary issue was raised.  The preliminary issue related to a supplementary affidavit which had been irregularly filed by the applicant.  On that day the applicant did not take issue with the affidavits which he is now attacks.  He raises it now.  That is totally unacceptable.  He should have raised it then.  I can do better than adopt what the Supreme Court stated in the case of NDEBELE v NCUBE 1992 (1) ZLR 288 AT 290 C-D where the following was stated:

“It is the policy of the law that there should be finality in litigation.  On the other hand one does not want to do injustice to litigants.  But it must be observed that in recent years applications for rescission, for condonation, for leave to apply or appeal out of time, and for other relief arising out of delays either by the individual or his lawyer, have rocketed in numbers.  We are bombarded with excuses for failure to act.  We are beginning to hear more appeals for charity than justice.  Incompetence is becoming a growth industry.  Petty disputes are argued and then re-argued until the costs far exceed the capital amount in dispute”.

On the question of the applicant’s conduct or waiver of the right to challenge the validity of the affidavits, the Supreme Court in ZIMBABWE BROADCASTING CORPORATIONS (PVT) LTD v IRVINE MHLANGA SC 58/21 stated that:

‘Waiver is when a person intentionally and with full knowledge, gives away his right to exercise or chooses not to exercise that right which the person would otherwise possess.”

See also CHIDZIVA AND OTHERS v ZISCO LTD 1997 (2) ZLR 368.  The applicant had ample time to challenge the affidavits both when the matter went on appeal and when the other party raised its reservations on the supplementary affidavit.  The court has to put a stop to unnecessary or 11th hour applications which delay finalization of matters.  There must be finality to litigation.

In S v HURLE & OTHERS (above) one of several accused persons absented himself when judgment was ready for delivery.  It was held that a discretion be exercised in favour of delivery of the judgment.  I believe that in the present case the discretion should be exercised in favour of finding the affidavit valid.

With respect to the date which is under scrutiny, there is no evidence that it is not the commissioner of oaths who inserted it.  As such it cannot be said, on a balance of probabilities, that the date was not inserted by the commissioner of oaths.  It is trite that he wo alleges must prove.

Having said the above, I find that there is no merit in the preliminary issue raised.  It must fail.

[7]	Accordingly the preliminary issue is dismissed.

MERITS – APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION

[8] 	In order for an application of this nature to succeed, the applicant must satisfactorily explain the following –

The extent of the delay having regard to the circumstances.

The reasonableness of the explanation for the delay.

Prospects of success should the application be granted.

Possible prejudice to the other party should the application be granted and the balance of convenience.

See:	FORESTRY COMMISSION v MOYO 1997 (1) ZLR 254 (S).

In	RINOS TERERA v GEORGE LENTAIGNE INGRAM LOCK AND THREE OTHERS SC 93/21 the Supreme Court (CHITAKUNYE AJA) stated that:

“One must be candid with the court in their explanation in order to satisfy the court that the explanation is reasonable and deserves the court’s empathy and that there are prospects of success if granted the indulgence.”

The learned Judge of Appeal quoted with approval the case of KODZWA V SECRETARY FOR HEALTH AND ANOTHER 1999 (1) ZLR 313(S) @ 315 B-E, that

“The factors which the court should consider in determining an application for condonation are clearly set out in HERBSTEIN AND VAN WINSEN’S THE CIVIL PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA 4TH EDITION by Van Winsen Cilliers and Loots at pp 897-898 as follows:

“Condonation of the non-observance of the rules is by no means a mere formality.  It is for the applicant to satisfy the court that there is sufficient cause to excuse him from compliance…

The court’s power to grant relief should not be exercised arbitrarily and upon the mere asking, but with proper judicial discretion and upon sufficient and satisfactory grounds being shown by the applicant..  In the determination whether sufficient cause has been shown, the basic principle is that the court has a discretion, to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of all facts, and in essence, it is a matter of fairness to both sides in which the court will endeavour to reach a conclusion that will be in the best interests of justice.  The factors usually weighed by the court in considering applications for condonation … include the degree of non-compliance, the explanation for it, the importance of the case, the prospects of success, the respondent’s interest in the finality of his judgment, the convenience of the court and the avoidance of unnecessary delay in the administration of justice”.

In DZVAIRO v KANGO PRODUCTS SC 35/17 the Supreme Court stated at page 4 of the cyclostyled judgment that:

“The appellant explains the delay by giving a series of unfortunate interactions with his inefficient lawyers.  KORSAH JA in KOMBAYI v BERKOUT 1988 (1) ZLR 53 (SC) stated thus:

The broad principles the court will follow in determining whether to condone the late noting of an appeal are: the extent of the delay; the reasonableness of the explanation for the delay; and the prospects of success.  If  the tardiness of the applicant is extreme, condonation will be granted only on his showing good grounds for the success of his appeal”.

And at page 5 the Supreme Court stated that:

“With regard to the appellant’s allegation that it was the incompetence of this erstwhile legal practitioner that led to the excessive delays the court a quo, correctly in my view, held that even where this is the case one cannot seek to insulate himself using such a defence.  A litigant will not be completely absolved from the incompetence of his or her legal practitioner.”

This principle was set out in the case of KOMBAYI v BERKOUT (supra) at p56 where KORSAH JA quoted with approval the case of SALOOJEE & ANOR NNO v MINISTER OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 1965 (2) SA 135 (A) at 141C where it was stated that:

“There is a limit beyond which a litigant cannot escape the results of his attorney’s lack of diligence or the insufficiency of the explanation tendered.  To hold otherwise might have a disastrous effect upon the observance of the rules of the Court.  Considerations ad misericordium should not be allowed to become an invitation to laxity.”

[9]	In the present matter, it is common cause that the delay in question is in excess of two years.  It is also common cause that the appellant appealed his dismissal to this court.  The appeal was dismissed (Judgment Number LC/H/136/20 and Order Number LC/ORD/577/20).

It is also common cause that the applicant once filed an application for condonation for an application for review.  He withdrew that application. (LC/H/APP/517/19).

[10]	In his founding affidavit the applicant places fault on is erstwhile legal practitioners.  He then states in paragraph 16 of his founding affidavit:

“16.	My erstwhile legal practitioners did not advise me that the disciplinary procedures were reviewable, regard being had to the procedural irregularity that afflicted them…  Had I been aware from the onset that I could apply for review, I would have, in addition to the appeal, applied for review as well.”

The above is obviously not true.  He filed an application for review and withdrew it.  He is obviously not being candid with the court.

[11]	The applicant was dismissed following conviction for violating paragraphs 4 and 24 respectively of the First Schedule section (2) of the Public Service Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 1/2000.  The misconduct charge reads as follows in part:

“I received a report on your part (sic) that you have been persistently reporting late for work and leaving work early without authorization despite this matter having been brought to your attention on a number of occasions.  It has also been brought to my attention that you have failed to comply with lawful instructions from your Deputy Director.

I have to inform you that it has been found that a charge of misconduct be preferred against you. Accordingly, you Zimbovora Muchineripi are charged with misconduct in terms of section 44(2) (a) Public Service Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 2000 as amended, also read in conjunction with the Audit Office Act (Chapter 22:18) section 35(3).  You are alleged to have conducted yourself in an improper, insubordinate or discourteous behaviour during the course of duty as defined in paragraph 4 of the First Schedule (section 2) of the Public Service Regulations, 2000.

You are also alleged to have acted in a manner inconsistent with or prejudicial to the discharge (of) official duties as defined in paragraph 24 of the First Schedule (section 2) of the Public Service Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 2000 as amended.

The grounds on which these charges are based are that:

On 11 September 2017 when you assumed duty from leave you arrived in the Office around 11:00 hours and by 15:00 hours you had left your work station without your Deputy Director’s authorization.

On the 12th and 13th September 2017 you arrived late and left early before knock off time.

On 14 September 2017 you arrived for work at 11:00 hours and when your Deputy Director tried to contact you through your mobile phone you did not pick the call.

On 19 September 2017 you arrived at work at 11:45 hours.  Prior to that time, your Deputy Director tried to contact you through your mobile phone but you did not answer your cellphone.  When you finally arrived, you then requested to take a half day off in lieu of the time you had been away without prior authority.

You have been disrespectful towards your manager as exhibited in your responses on the issue of time management.

On 20 September 2017 you refused to acknowledge receipt (by signing) of a memo that was written to you by your Deputy Director.

…”

Paragraph 4 of the First Schedule (Section 2) reads as follows:

“4.  	Improper, threatening, insubordinate or discourteous behaviour, including sexual harassment, during the course of duty towards any member of the Public Service or any member of the public.”

And

Paragraph 24 of the same Schedule reads:

“24. 	Any act or omission which is inconsistent with or prejudicial to the discharge of official duties, including the abuse of authority.”

[12]	I have quoted extensively from the charge sheet in order to put into context the nature of the application which the applicant has embarked on     vis-a-vis the case he faced before the employer.

[13]	Mr. Mutero who appeared on behalf of the applicant submitted that the applicant was not aware that both an appeal and review could be pursued at the same time.  This was submitted in support of the applicant’s explanation for the delay.  This is obviously not true given what is common cause.                 In paragraph 7.2 of the Heads of Argument filed on behalf of the applicant the following is stated (in part):

“The explanation that the Applicant was not aware that both appeal and review proceedings could be pursued at the same time is not challenged and it is confirmed by the fact that as soon as condonation for filing of an appeal was granted on 20 September 2019, the retired legal practitioners withdrew the application for condonation for late filing of an application for review under LC/H/APP/517/19 ON 23 September, 2019.”

Applicant persists that he was not advised that the review application could be pursued at same time as the appeal and yet it is common cause that the said application or a similar application as the present one was once filed as shown in the Heads of Argument.  Mr. Mutero submitted that the applicant should not suffer because of the legal representation he had initially sought.  In support of this submission Mr. Mutero referred the Court to authority.  One of the cases referred to was TSHOVA MUBAIWA TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED AND OTHERS V MPOFU AND OTHERS HB 167-04. Mr Mutero submitted that the court has a discretion to grant condonation after considering all the facts cumulatively.

[14]	In addressing the prospects of success Mr. Mutero averred that the applicant enjoyed prospects of success.  He raised four intended grounds for review namely, that the disciplinary committee was not properly constituted; that the disciplinary committee ignored the guidelines in imposing penalties which guidelines were binding on it; that the disciplinary Committee did not give reasons for the findings it made; and that the findings of the disciplinary committee were irrational.  Mr. Mutero submitted that the disciplinary committee included Mr. Magogo a legal practitioner for the employer.  It was Mr. Mutero’s submission that the presence of Mr. Magogo offended against S43(2)(c) of the [Public Service] Regulations Statutory Instrument 1 of 2000.

[15]	It was Mr. Mutero’s submission that the employer could be advised but not represented by a legal practitioner and that it was only a member/employee who, in terms of the Regulations is entitled to representation during the course of disciplinary proceedings.

[16]	Mr. Mutero then addressed the question of findings.  He argued that they were not backed by any reasons and that this was fatal.  Mr. Mutero persisted that the findings by the respondent were irrational.

[17]	In response Mr. Magogo who appeared for the respondent argued the delay was in ordinate and for that reason, that should be found against the applicant.  Mr. Magogo argued that there was no reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application for condonation.  Mr. Magogo submitted that while the applicant places blame on his erstwhile legal practitioners, such explanation does not amount to a reasonable explanation.  Mr. Magogo referred this court to authority.  Some of the authorities cited in support of this submission are KM AUCTIONS (PRIVATE) LIMITED v ADENASH SAMUEL SC 15/2012; SELK ENTERPRISES (PRIVATE) LIMITED v OLIVER HUNUNGWE CHIMENYA AND OTHERS SC10/03; MM PRETORIUS (PRIVATE) LIMITED & ANOTHER v MUTYAMBIZI SC 39/2012.

Mr. Magogo argued that the explanation given for the delay is false in view of the fact he withdrew an application he had made under case number LC/H/APP/517/19.

[18]	Mr. Magogo submitted that it is settled that if a litigant lies in one material respect, the Court will be entirely justified in taking the view that he has lied in other respects.  In support of this submission reliance was placed on MORONEY v MOONEY SC24/13.

[19]	Mr. Magogo submitted that in view of the contradictory explanations regarding the reasonableness of the explanation for the delay, the applicant has got no satisfactory explanation for the delay.  Mr. Magogo also argued that the applicant put a lot of blame on his erstwhile legal practitioners but did not allow them to confirm or deny the position.  He relied on DIOCESAN TRUSTEES FOR THE DIOCESE OF HARARE v THE CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF CENTRAL AFRICA SC 09/10. For this reason Mr. Magogo submitted that this must be resolved against the applicant.

[20]	On the prospects of success Mr. Magogo submitted that this court has already definitively and conclusively dealt with the matter through the appeal and judgment LC/H/136/20.  The matter can therefore not be resurrected.  Further in view of the fact the applicant withdrew a similar application, he waived his right to making the application and he is estopped from seeking review again. (CHIDZIVA & OTHERS v ZISCO LTD 1997 (2) ZLR 368 (S); MASHAVE v STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED 1998 (1) ZLR 436).

It was Mr. Magogo’s further submission that the employer’s decision on the merits is not challenged.  For this reason he cannot succeed on the basis of technicalities.  Reference was made the case of AIR ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD v MNENSA & ANOTHER SC 89/04.

In AIR ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD v MNENSA & ANOTHER (above) the Supreme Court stated:

“A person guilty of misconduct should not escape the consequence of his misdeeds simply because of a failure to conduct disciplinary proceedings properly by another employee.  He should escape such consequences because he is innocent.”

[21]	In the present case the applicant’s guilt was confirmed by this court when he lost the appeal.  One wonders what is sought to be achieved in the event that the application is succeeds.  This is only by way of observation.  This should not be taken as affecting the need to satisfy the requirements in an application for condonation.

[22]	The first requirement is to consider the extent of the delay.  The delay was for some two years.  There was no satisfactory explanation for the delay.  In the process of explaining the reasonableness of the delay the applicant made some false statements.  That clearly fails to have the Court believe him. The delay was inordinate.

It is possible that where the delay is inordinate but there is a reasonable explanation, the court is likely to exercise its discretion in favour of granting rather than refusing the indulgence.  In TSHOVA MUBAIWA TRANSPORT COOPERATIVE LIMITED & 4 OTHERS v JOSPHAT MPOFU AND 4 OTHERS (above) the High Court held that while courts have held that a litigant chooses his own legal practitioner and through that choice he or she fails through the choice so made, this principle is not cast in stone.  The submission was that the applicant’s explanation for delay should be considered in conjunction with other factors.  In the present case those other factors actually worsen the applicant’s case.

In the MORONEY case (above) the Supreme Court commenting on the respondent’s evidence in that case stated as follows:

“It was the appellant’s contention which contention I accept, that the respondent failed to truthfully and adequately explain the circumstances of how the various amounts that the respondent claimed came from Helena Limited found their way into the Standard Chartered Isle of Man Account.  The court ought to have disbelieved him.  From the tenor of respondent’s testimony, it is quite clear that he was less than candid with the court in regard to how he amassed his financial resources and the sources of such funds.”(Emphasis added).

In LEADER TREAD ZIMBABWER (PVT) LTD v SMITH HH 131-03 NDOU J at page 7 of the cyclostyled judgment stated as follows:

“It is trite that if a litigant gives false evidence, his story will be discarded and the same adverse inferences may be drawn as if he had not given evidence at all – See TUMAHOLE BERENG v R (1949) AC 253 AND SOUTH AFRICA LAW OF EVIDENCE by LH Hoffman and DT Zeffect 3rd Edition at page 472.  If a litigant lies about a particular incident, the court may infer that there is something about it which he wishes to hide.”

[23]	On the prospects of success he relies on technicalities.  The technicalities are premised on alleged violations of the regulations.  The relevant provisions are as follows:

S43 provides: for Disciplinary Committees.  S43 (2 provides that:

“(2) A disciplinary Committee appointed by–

(a) 	...

(b)	…

(c)	a head of department shall consist of –

a chairman who shall be the deputy head of department or a member nominated by the deputy head of department to act on his behalf who is approved by the head of department; and

two other members appointed by the head of department who shall be confirmed members.”

And

S 45(3) provides that

“(3)  At the hearing the member and the disciplinary committee may, if either so wishes, be advised and in the case of the member, represented by a legal practitioner.”

The applicant raises the presence of Mr. Magogo at the hearing as the respondent’s legal practitioner, as being irregular.   As the minutes show, Mr. Magogo was not part of the committee.  He was the employer’s lawyer.  He was not cited as a member of the committee.  Legal representation is a constitutional right which a person is entitled to.  A person, either natural or juristic is entitled to legal representation of his or her own choice.  Thus while the regulations narrow the extent to which presentation is available to an employee, the constitutional provisions bestow the right to representation on both parties. There is therefore no irregularity caused by the employer being represented.

The applicant raises the issue of some guidelines which allegedly the respondent failed to follow when considering the appropriate penalty.  The said guidelines are meant to guide the respondent.  They do not form part of S.I 1/2000.  Even had they formed part of S.I. 1/2000, the discretion of deciding what the appropriate penalty is, is the employer’s province and is not to be lightly interfered with.  It can only be interfered with when it has been improperly exercised.  In RIO ZIMBABWE (PRIVATE) LIMITED v TRUST BANK CORPORATION LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) SC 87/21 the Supreme Court stated that:

“The position is now settled that where a lower court exercises a discretion, the higher court cannot interfere unless the lower court has committed one or more of the four cardinal errors.  These are, acting upon a wrong principle, allowing extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect it, mistaking the facts or failing to take into account some relevant consideration.  (BARROS & ANOTHER v CHIMPONDA 1999 (1) ZLR 58 (S)).”

[24]	The applicant avers that there are no reasons for the decision.  Indeed it is trite that failure to give reasons for a decision is fatal to proceedings.  See    PG INDUSTRIES (ZIMBABWE) LIMITED v MARK BVEKERWA & 34 OTHERS SC 53/16 where the Supreme Court quoted with approval the case of MUCHAPONDWA v MADAKE & OTHERS 2006 (1) Z\LR 194 (4) where  the court stated that

“When a matter is opposed and the issues have been argued it is unacceptable for a court to make an order without giving any reasons for it, since the litigants are entitled to be informed of the reasons for the decision”

It is my considered view however that the document titled “Misconduct Determination and Penalty” is self-explanatory.  The relevant part of the document (pager 93) reads:

“1.  	Reference is made to the misconduct charges preferred against you on 14 February, 2018 and the subsequent disciplinary hearing which took place on the 15th and 25th of June 2018.

2.	Please be informed that in terms of section 46(1) of the Public Service Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 2000 as amended, I found you guilty on the allegations that:-

(i)	You violated paragraph 4 of the First Schedule of the above stated Regulations by persistently reporting late for work and leaving work early without authorization during the period 11-20 September, 2017.  On follow up by your superiors you either did not answer calls directed to your mobile phone or you would offer stubborn and disrespectful responses.  On 20 September you were requested to sign an acknowledgement of receipt of a memo relating to the same issue of time management and you flatly refused to sign the memo.

You violated paragraph 24 of the First Schedule of the same Regulations.  Your insubordinate behaviour has been found to be clearly inconsistent with and prejudicial to your discharge of official duties and it evidently had a negative impact on the other members of staff.  You have also proved to be a serial unrepentant late comer who does not respect authority and you are insubordinate.

3.	After considering the gravity of the charges levelled against you and acting in terms of Section 46(1)(b) stated above, you Muchineripi Zimbovora are hereby discharged from the office of the Auditor General with immediate effect. …”

[25]	With the above, it is clear that the technicalities raised by the applicant are not sustainable.  In AIR ZIMBABWE (PRIVATE) LIMITED v MNENSA & ANOTHER (above) the Supreme Court held that a person should not escape the consequences of his misdeeds on account of another employee‘s failure to conduct disciplinary proceedings properly.  He should escape because he is innocent.  It is clear that the conduct of the applicant is reproachable.  By seeking review, even if it were found that the respondent had in some respect erred, would not in my considered view, absolve the applicant from the consequences of his misdeeds.  The conduct is grave.  The applicant’s case on the merits is hopeless.

DISPOSITION

[26]	In the result I find that the Applicant has dismally failed to discharge the onus required of him.  The application for condonation for late application of an application for review fails.

Accordingly it is ordered that the application for condonation for late filing an application for review and extension of time within which to file an application for review be and is hereby dismissed with costs.

MESSERS CALEB MUCHECHE & PARTNERS – Applicant’s Legal Practitioners

MAKUWAZA & MAGOGO ATTORNEYS – Respondent’s legal practitioners