State v Tinashe Mashami and State v Mike Yonasi and 3 Others

### Preamble
1
HH 183-21
1. STATE
CRB CHG 1874/20
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1.	STATE 								CRB CHG 1874/20

versus

TINASHE MASHAMI

2.	STATE								CRB CHG 114-7/20

Versus

MIKE YONASI AND 3 OTHERS

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

CHITAPI  & MUSITHU JJ

HARARE, 21 April, 2021.

Review Judgment

CHITAPI J: The proceedings in the two matters under review suffer from the same irregularity. They were dealt with by the same learned provincial magistrate who to her credit has acknowledged her acts of omission. Upon my perusal of the two records on review, I raised a query that it did not appear on record that the learned provincial magistrate had complied with the provisions of s 163A of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, [Chapter 9:07] at the commencement of the two trials. I therefore revert to s 163A aforesaid. It provides as follows:

“163A	Accussed in magistrates court to be informed of section 191 rights

(1)	At the commencement of any trial in a magistrates court before the accused is called upon 		to plead to the summons or charge, the accused shall be informed by the magistrate of his 		or her right in terms of s 191 to legal or other representation

(2)	the magistrate shall record the fact that the accused has been given the information referred 		to in subsection (1), and the accused’s response to it.”

The section 191 rights referred to in s 163A are provided for as follows:

“191	Legal representation

Every person charged with an offence may make his defence at his trial and have the witnesses 	examined or cross examined-

(a)	by a legal practitioner representing him; or

(b)	in the case of an accused person under the age of sixteen years who is being tried in the 			magistrates court, by his natural or legal guardian; or

(c)	where the court considers he requires the assistance of another person, and has permitted 			him to be so assisted, by that other person.”

In the two cases herein, the learned provincial magistrate in response to my query explained her omission to comply with the provisions of s 163A at the commencement of trial by submitting that she mistakenly thought that since the accused persons had been informed of the rights to legal representation when they appeared before the court for initial remand, it was no longer necessary to advise or inform the accused persons of the right at the commencement of their trials.

There are two stages which an arrested person goes through after such person’s arrest. The first stage is the arrested person’s initial appearance before the court from the hands or control of the police. The initial appearance which is colloquially referred to as initial remand is a constitutional imperative under s 50 (2) of the constitution, which obliges police to bring to court an arrested or detained person for an alleged offence within forty eight hours of the arrest failing which the person should be released unconditionally unless the further detention is properly sanctioned by the court. In terms of the provisions of para (d) of subs (4) of s 50 of the constitution the arrested person should at his or her first appearance be charged or be informed of the reason for the person’s continued detention or be released. It is at this stage that the accused in the two cases were informed of their rights to legal representation. They were however not tried but placed on remand, bail being subsequently denied.

In the case of Tinashe Mashami all there is on record is that on 6 February, 2020 he appeared before a magistrate who remanded him in custody and ordered him to return to court on 12 February, 2020. There is no indication that he was advised of the rights to legal representation contrary to what the learned provincial magistrate indicated in her response to my query. Be that as it may, trial commenced on 12 February, 2020. There is no indication on record that the provisions of s 163A aforesaid were complied with. I have already noted that the learned provincial magistrate admitted that she did not act in terms thereof. To complete the picture in regard to this case, some flesh on what the case entailed is set out herein below.

The accused Tinashe Mashami was charged with the offence of robbery as defined in s 126 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. The details of the charge were that on 21 December 2019 at around 0200 hours and at Chakari Rural Council, the accused in the company of six other persons, used violence or threats of violence and assaulted one Stewart Munatsi all over his body using machetes, logs and knives. It was alleged that the accused took from the complainant two cell phone handsets, two buddie sim cards and cash amounting to USD420.00 ZWL$682. The gang took a further USD1 380 from the complainant’s house after disclosure of its whereabouts by the complainant’s wife who felt fearful after witnessing the vicious assault on her husband by the accused and his accomplices. She then disclosed to the gang where the money was kept in the house. The robbery was committed consequent upon a forced unlawful entry into the complainant’s house by the accused and his accomplices. Nothing of the stolen property was recovered. The accused therefore committed two crimes of unlawful entry and robbery. It was competent to charge the accused of the more serious offence of robbery albeit the robbery was committed in consequence of the unlawful entry having been first committed.

The accused was convicted as charged following a full trial. The learned provincial magistrate sentenced the accused person to four years imprisonment before suspending one year imprisonment for five years on condition of good behaviour and a further one year on condition of restitution. The effective sentence was two years imprisonment. The accused was sentenced on 28 February, 2020. I need to comment on the reasons for sentence. The learned provincial magistrate after convicting the accused called upon the accused to make submissions in mitigation. The following appears from the record”

“MITIGATION

39 years old

married

have 2 children

Aged  and 2 years old

Not employed

Do piece jobs

No savings

No valuable assets”

The mitigation was therefore limited to an address on personal circumstances of the accused. There was no submission made in regard to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence. The accused was not represented. It was the duty of the learned magistrate to direct the accused if he so wished to address on the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence. The magistrate should have explained to the accused the import and purport of mitigation and factors which the accused needed to address on as would constitute mitigation. Without proper direction on mitigation, the unrepresented person as in this case will not address salient mitigatory areas. The result is that the magistrate is left without meaningful mitigation from which to balance the aggravating and mitigatory factors and to properly exercise the discretion to pass an informed sentence. It is absolutely important that the convict is directed to address on circumstance surrounding the commission of the offence and that if he chooses to so address, he or she should address factors which lessen the convict’s degree or level of moral blameworthiness. I have adverted to this shortcoming by the learned provincial magistrate for posterity because the issue that disposes of this review is the effect of the omission by the learned magistrate to comply with the provisions of s 163A of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. It is however the duty of the judge on review to give directions on any matter arising in the proceedings on review for posterity.

For the same reasons of guidance, I consider it appropriate to comment on the sentence which was imposed by the learned provincial magistrate. She was again not properly directed to assess sentence in that she did not determine whether or not the robbery was committed in aggravatory circumstances. Section 126 (2) of the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act, provides as follows

“(2)	A person convicted of robbery shall be liable-

(a)	to imprisonment for life or any definite period of imprisonment, if the  crime was 			committed in aggravating circumstances as provided in subsection (3): or

(b)	in any other case

(i)	to a fine not exceeding level fourteen or twice the value of the property that forms the basis 		of the subject of the charge, whichever is the greater; or

(ii)	to imprisonment not exceeding fifty years or both

Provided that the court may suspend the whole or any part of a sentence of imprisonment imposed 	for robbery on condition that the convicted person restores any property stolen by him or her to the 	person deprived of it or compensates such person for its loss

(3)	For the purpose of subsection (2); robbery is committed in aggravating circumstances if 			the convicted person or an accomplice of the convicted person

(a)	possessed a fire-arm or a dangerous weapon; or

(b)	inflicted or threatened to inflict serious bodily injury upon any person; or

(c)	killed a person

On the occasion on which the crime was committed.”

In casu, the accused and his accomplices used an unknown object to force open the main entrance door to gain access into the complainant house. The complainant was sleeping with his wife. The time was around 0200 hours. The accused and his accomplices were armed with machetes, logs and knives.

The accused and his accomplices no doubt used dangerous weapons in assaulting the complainant to induce submission and relinquish possession and control of his property. The accused and his accomplices inflicted serious injury on the complainant as observed and commented upon by the doctor in the medical report which was produced in evidence. The accused therefore committed the robbery of the complainant in aggravating circumstances. They terrorised the complainant’s daughter by threatening to kill her. The complainant’s wife out of fear hid under the bed. The conduct of the accused and his accomplices can only be described as pure savagery.

The learned provincial magistrate was not alive to the need to make a finding on whether or not the robbery was committed in aggravatory circumstances. In the reasons for sentence the learned magistrate indicated that she considered that the accused was a family man and a first offender. She also stated that she considered that the complainant did not suffer any permanent disability. The learned magistrate then ended by stating that:

“the court was disturbed by the violence displayed by the accused and the prevalence of such cases”

She also indicated that a lengthy custodial sentence with a portion suspended on condition of good behaviour and restitution was appropriate. The failure to make a finding that the robbery was committed in aggravating circumstances resulted in the learned provincial magistrate imposing what in my view was too lenient a sentence given the circumstances of the commission of the offence.

Although a dangerous weapon is not defined in section 126 aforesaid which creates the offence of robbery, reference should in this regard be made to the ordinary grammatical meaning of a dangerous weapon. In the Merriam –Webster Legal Dictionary accessed at www.merriam-webster.com/legal/dangerous%20 weapon (accessed on 9 April, 2021), the legal definition of a dangerous weapon is given as

“an object that when used as an instrument of offence is capable of causing serious bodily harm”

I would add that the instrument must not only be capable of causing serious bodily harm  but even death.

The accused and his five accomplices assaulted the complainant with logs whilst demanding money and cellphones. The complainant’s will was subdued and he surrendered USD420, ZWL682, and two cellphones with two buddie sim cards to the robbers. The accused was the ringleader. He commanded his accomplices to further assault the complainant so that he surrenders more money. The accused’s accomplice assaulted the complainant with a machete whilst threatening to kill his daughter. The complainant’s wife had in the meantime hidden under the bed. The accused and accomplices ordered the complainant to join his wife under the bed. The complainant’s wife in fear of further torture disclosed where complainant kept money in the house. The robbers then took another USD1380 which complainant kept in the house and went away.

The complainant was attended to on 31 December, 2019 at Kadoma General Hospital. A medical report was prepared by a doctor who examined him. The report was produced by consent of the accused. The doctor noted the following injuries as listed in the report

“-    abrasion of the right upper back

linear abrasion on the back

facial laceration on the left

laceration as left risk and forearm

Crepitus of the left wrist.”

The doctor noted that the injuries suffered by the complainant were severe and that there was a possibility that the complainant’s wrist was fractured because of the crepitus or creaky sound produced by the wrist on moving it.

My view is that this case should not have been placed before the learned provincial magistrate because of her limited maximum jurisdiction to impose a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding five years for any offence be it on summary trial or remittal by the Prosecutor General. At best the learned provincial magistrate could have, had she been properly directed to find aggravating circumstances present in the commission of the offence as apparent from this judgment, referred the record to the Prosecutor General for consideration and a possible direction for the accused to be referred for sentence by the High Court. The issue of the magistrate sentencing jurisdiction for robbery committed in aggravating circumstances is taken care of by the legislature in s 51 (2) (b) of the Magistrates court Act, [Chapter 7:10]. The section reads as follows:

“51.	Special jurisdiction as to punishment

(1)	…….

(2)	Notwithstanding section fifty, the jurisdiction of a court of a regional magistrate in respect 		of punishment for

(a)	………

(b)	robbery or attempted robbery if the court finds in terms of subsection (3) that aggravating 		circumstances were present; whether on summary trial or remittal by the Prosecutor 			General shall be

(i)	imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve years

(ii)	a fine not exceeding level thirteen

(3)	A regional magistrate shall find aggravating circumstances to have been present in relation 		to an offence specified in para (b) of subs (2) if it is proved—

that the offender or an accomplice of the offender, whether or not it is proved which possessed a fire-arm or dangerous weapon, or

inflicted or threatened to inflict grievous bodily harm; or

unlawfully killed a person.”

It is therefore clear that the provisions of subs (3) of s 51 of the Magistrate Court Act restate the provisions of subs (3) of 126 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act in relation to defining aggravating circumstances. There is no increased jurisdiction given to any magistrate other than the regional magistrate to impose a sentence for robbery. Although any magistrate other than a regional magistrate is not jurisdictionally disqualified to preside a case of robbery committed in aggravating circumstances, the intention of the legislature was that such an offence be presided over  at the very least by a regional magistrate whose jurisdiction on sentence is deliberately increased thus showing the serious view that the legislature takes of the offence. It is therefore important in my view that the Prosecutor General may in his discretion consider placing cases of robbery committed in aggravating circumstances before a regional magistrate who enjoys increased jurisdiction on sentence. The accused who faces a more serious case of robbery may  be indicted for trial before the High Court in view of the courts jurisdiction to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or any definite term of imprisonment which may exceed the 12 years imprisonment which a regional magistrate may impose. Only the High Court can impose a life imprisonment term.

In my assessment of the facts and circumstances of this case and the accused’s personal circumstances, the sentence imposed by the learned provisional magistrate was disturbingly inappropriate and did not give effect to the serious view which the legislature takes of the offence of robbery committed in aggravating circumstances. Robbery constitutes a serious violation of constitutional safeguards accorded every person by the constitution. The offence violates a person’s right to personal security, freedom from physical or psychological torture or to cruel inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and (in this case) right to privacy of home and property. An accused person and/or accomplice who commits a robbery in aggravating circumstances should be adequately punished as provided for by the legislature. I am however incapacitated to declare what the appropriate sentence should have been in this case as I do not have the benefit of input from the Prosecutor General. However, I have no hesitation to declare that the sentence is not accordance with real and substantial justice more so given that the learned provincial magistrate was misdirected in the assessment of sentence as already discussed. The comments I have made on sentence are for posterity and guidance because the review is resolved upon the consideration of the effect of the learned magistrate’s admitted failure to comply with the provisions of s 163A as aforesaid.

In regard to the record of Mike Jonasi & 3 Ors v State, the four accused persons were similarly convicted of robbery as defined in s 126 (1) (a) of the Criminal Law (Codification & Reform) Act. The details of the charge were that the accused used violence against the complainant to induce submission where after they entered the complainant’s tuck-shop and stole some grocery items therefrom. As regards the nature of the unlawful force used, the accused persons allegedly broke into the complainant’s tuck-shop where the complainant a 20 year old female adult was sleeping. It was around 0300 hours on 15 January 2020 at Toyi Shopping Centre, Selous. Three of the accused persons entered the tuck-shop whilst the fourth accused remained outside keeping watch. One of the accused held the complainant whilst threatening her with a knife. At the same time he poked the complainant’s private parts. The other two packed groceries into a sack. The complainant was also assaulted on her knee and shoulder by one of the accused persons. The four accused acted in concert and with a common purpose. In the premises, the act of one of them committed in the course of and with the intention of following and achieving the common goal of robbing the complaint became the act of them all. They were co-perpetrators within the meaning given in s 196A of the Criminal Law (Codification & Reform) Act.

The four accused were convicted following a full trial. They were each sentenced as follows:

“Each 5 years imprisonment of which 6 months are suspended for 3 years on condition accused does not within that period commit an offence involving robbery as an element for which if convicted he will be imprisoned without the option of a fine. A further 6 months are suspended on condition each accused restitutes $1500 to Fadzanai Chimanga through the Clerk of Court by 04:00 p.m. on 30 April 2020.

Effective: 4 years imprisonment.”

The trial of the four accused commenced on 19 February 2020. After recording the accused persons’ names, the learned magistrate’s name, the names of the interpreter and prosecutor, the following appears on record:

“Trial

Ct	All witnesses excused from the court-room.

Charge read to the accused persons and understood

Q	How you plead

A1	I deny

A2	I deny

A3	I deny

A4	I deny

Cr	All pleas of not guilty

Facts read and understood

ss 188 and 189 for CPE Act  explained and understood.”

Thereafter the accused persons outlined their defences in which they denied being at the scene and thus denied the actus reus. As is now common cause, there was no reference to the invocation of s 163A of the Criminal Procedure & Evidence Act by the learned magistrate. The State opened its case. Trial proceeded in its normal run to the end. As noted, the determination of the irregularity of the proceedings in this case rests on the effect of the omission by the learned provisional magistrate to apply the provisions of s 163A as aforesaid.

As with the first case reviewed herein I am not satisfied that the sentence imposed even if the trial was found to be regular meets the threshold of real and substantial justice. I repeat the same comments I made in the first case in relation to sentence and the legislative intent in granting expanded sentence jurisdiction to the court of a regional magistrate for the offence of robbery committed in aggravating circumstances. In casu, the robbery was committed in a callous manner by a group of men against a defenceless 20 year old youthful girl who had locked herself in the tuck-shop which she used as sleeping quarters to guard the grocery provisions from thieves. Not only was the complainant physically assaulted by grabbing her and by being hit with a catapult on the knees and shoulder and being threatened with an okapi knife, but she was poked in her private parts, thus violating her womanly and personal dignity. In terms of the provisions of s 51 of the Constitution, every person has inherent dignity in public and in private and the right to the protection and respect for that dignity. Section 52 of the constitution in subs (a) provides that every person has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes the right –

“(a)	 to freedom from all forces of violence from public and private sources.”

The right to human dignity is jealously protected by the constitution as evident from the provisions of para (b) of subs (3) of s 86 which provides that “no law may limit --- and no person may violate” the right. The learned provincial magistrate should have been guided that the circumstances of the offence before her were of grave proportions calling for a more severe sentence than what she imposed. The robbery was committed in aggravating circumstances since it was preceded by an unlawful entry and the use of a dangerous weapon, an okapi knife. The bottom line is that the prosecutor could have assisted matters by properly appreciating the gravity of the offence and arraigning the accused persons for trial before a regional magistrate.

In casu, the learned provincial magistrate obviously appreciated the seriousness of the offence and imposed a sentence equating to her maximum jurisdiction. It would have been understandable had the offence in question been one for which her level of magistracy enjoyed increased jurisdiction of between 7 and 10 years imprisonment or increased fines. Robbery committed in aggravating circumstances is not one of the offences where increased jurisdiction is provided for in s 51 of the Magistrate Court Act to a provincial magistrate. Only the regional magistrate is singled out and granted increased jurisdiction for listed offences inter alia, robbery or attempted robbery committed in aggravating circumstances. The learned provincial magistrate would have been advised to withhold her jurisdiction after going through the charge and facts and asked the prosecutor to make submissions on why a robbery case whose facts show that it was committed in aggravating circumstances should not be tried in the Regional Court or the High Court. The learned provincial magistrate would then have made a final decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction or to continue with the case.

I have sadly noted over the years that there is a lot of hype and bias towards crimes against property and less of that in relation to crimes against the person. This is evidenced in cases coming up on review and in bail court. It is not unusual to find that more than one State counsel is assigned to deal with a bail application in cases involving offences against property and other cases involving prominent persons. The same does not happen with crimes such as murder, robbery and kindred offences against the person. It is high time that courts and the Prosecutor General’s office should work together to give effect to the legislative intent  in crimes against the person wherein the legislature has provided for heavy sentences like in robbery cases committed in aggravating circumstances murders and sexual offences. The rights to human dignity and against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment are inviolable. With the legislature having provided heavy sentences in relation to offences against the person which include inter alia robbery, the Prosecutor General’s office and the lower courts must wake up and come to the party by  causing trials on such charges to be brought in the appropriate court with sufficient sentence jurisdiction  in order to uphold legislative intent on sentence. A serious offence such as robbery committed in aggravating circumstances as are envisaged in s 126 (1) as read with subs 2 (a) and (3) of the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act and as further read with s 51 (2) and (3) of the Magistrate Court Act, should as a rule be tried by the Regional Magistrate or the High Court unless the Prosecutor has special reasons to have such a serious case tried by a lower level magistrate.

The disposal of the review of the two cases as I have already noted turns on whether the proceedings are certifiable as being in accordance with real and substantial justice in the face of the learned provincial magistrate’s admitted failure to comply with the provisions of s 163A of the Criminal Procedure & Evidence Act. The effect of a failure by the magistrate to comply with the peremptory provisions of s 163A aforesaid is a settled matter in this court and a number of cases reviewed by judges of this court show agreement on such effect. In the case of S v Manetaneta HH 185/20, the magistrate did not apply the provisions of s 163A at the commencement of trial of the accused. The accused was however convicted on the charge of prospecting for gold without being the holder of a licence in contravention of s 368 (4) of the Mines and Minerals Act, [Chapter 21:05]. The learned judge Dube-banda J after analysing the provisions of s 163A	stated on pp 4 and 5 of the cyclostyled judgment stated.

“By operation of s 163A (1) as read with s 191 of the CPE Act, at the commencement of the trial, an accused must be informed by the court of his right to legal representation. The magistrate shall record the fact that the accused has been informed of such rights and his response thereto must be recorded. This is a peremptory requirement.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Constitution) guarantees every accused person the right to a fair trial, this includes the right to legal representation. The right enacted in s 163A of the CPE Act is procedural. The substantive right is located in s 69 of the Constitution which provides that every person has a right at their own expense to be represented by a legal practitioner before any court, tribunal or forum. Thereafter the right to legal representation is a right of substance not form, and it is the cornerstone of a fair trial. In my view, the starting point in determining the fairness of a trial as envisaged in s 69 (1) of the Constitution should always be whether or not the accused is informed of his right to legal representation. He must be properly informed and his answers recorded so that if there is waiver of such-right, it would be an informed one.

The enquiry is whether the failure to inform the accused of his constitutional right to legal representation is an irregularity so fundamental and serious to the extent that it can be regarded as fatal to the proceedings in which it occurred. I am of the view that the failure to inform the accused of this right amounts to an irregular or illegal departure from those formalities, rules and principles or procedure in accordance with which the law requires a criminal trial to be initiated and conducted, and that such irregularity is fatal to the proceedings. It is an irregularity so fundamental that the court must set aside the conviction without reference to the merits and leave the issue to the Prosecutor General to decide whether the accused should be retried.

In conclusion, the failure by the trial court to inform the accused of his constitutional right to legal representation, is an irregularity that is fatal to the proceedings. In terms of s 29 (2) (b) (1) of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06], I find that the proceedings in the court a quo were not in accordance with real and substantial justice, as a result, a substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred. The conviction cannot stand.”

The learned judge with my concurrence quashed the irregular proceedings and granted the Prosecutor General leave, in his discretion to institute a fresh trial of the accused. The above judgment was delivered on 26 February 2020 before the proceedings  on review in casu were instituted. The learned provisional magistrate appears not to have been guided by this judgment.

In a later judgment by myself with which CHINAMORA J agreed, being the case of Potifa Sawaka v State HH 262/20 delivered on 9 April 2020 the same reasoning that a failure to comply with s 163A of the Criminal Procedure & Evidence Act, vitiates a trial was adopted. It is stated in that judgment that a purported trial in which the peremptory provisions of s 163A have not been followed is a sham trial not provided for by the legislative provisions on how a criminal trial should be conducted. I stated as follows on p 5 of the cyclostyled judgment:

“…The provisions of s 163A are peremptory and not directory. A failure to comply with the peremptory procedural steps cannot result in a trial as envisaged by statute. It cannot be sanitized. In my considered judgment, a trial which does not comply with the statute which defines how the trial must be conducted renders the trial a nullity and for that reason a nullity begets a nullity. The infamous judgment of LORD DENNING in Macfoy v United African Company Ltd (1961) (3) WLR (PC) 1405 at 1409 comes to mind where the learned judge stated, “ you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.” See also Manning v Manning 1986 (2) ZLR (1) SC.”

In the same judgment consideration was given to the effect of the provisions of s 29 (3) of the High Court Act which prescribe that no conviction or sentence should be set aside on review for any irregularity or defect in the record of proceedings under review unless the High Court or a judge thereof considers that a substantial miscarriage of justice actually accused. The position was taken that since compliance with s 163A was a fair trial imperative, a failure to comply rendered the trial unfair. In terms of the provision of s 86 (3) (2) no law may limit or violate the right to a fair trial. Therefore the provisions of s 29 (3) could not be construed as intended to violate the right to a fair trial. The proceedings in the two matters under review herein were irregular and not in accordance with peremptory legislative provisions on how a criminal trial in the Magistrates Court should be conducted, regard being had to the provisions of s 163A. The proceedings must be quashed and in that regard, the following order shall ensue.

The proceedings in case Numbers CHG 1874/20and CHG 114-117/20 are quashed and the convictions of the accused persons and sentences imposed upon them in consequence of the conviction are set aside.

The accused person are entitled to their immediate release.

The Prosecutor General in his discretion may institute a fresh prosecution of the accused persons, provided that in the event that each or all of them are convicted, any sentence which may be imposed shall take into account the period already served by each of the accused.

The Registrar shall ensure that this judgment is forwarded to the Chief Magistrate and the Prosecutor General to note the concerns raised on jurisdictional issues in cases of robbery committed in aggravating circumstances.

MUSITHU J, I agree ………………………………..