Nabane ROY Tshuma Versus Tongai Musemburi AND Tendai Musemburi AND Mackson Totshane Ncube AND THE Registrar OF Deeds

### Preamble
HH 11-2010
HC 755/94
NABANE ROY TSHUMA
versus
TONGAI MUSEMBURI
---------


==============================

NABANE ROY TSHUMA
versus
TONGAI MUSEMBURI
and
TENDAI MUSEMBURI
and
MACKSON TOTSHANE NCUBE
and
THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE,
KARWI J
HARARE, 20 January 2010

Civil Trial

Mrs J Wood, for Applicant
D Mehta, for first and second defendants

KARWI J: The plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as “Tshuma”) issued summons out of this court in February 1994 seeking the eviction of the first and second defendants (hereinafter referred as “the Musemburis”) from a property known as number 18 Ridgeway South, Highlands, Harare (hereafter referred as “the property”) and payment of damages. The Musemburis counterclaimed for the cancellation of the transfer of the property to the applicant and the subsequent transfer of the same property to them. The two matters were consolidated and are the subject matter of this trial.

This is a long drawn matter which has a very long history and has been through the whole court system at its different levels. The chronology of events in this case is as follows:

On 11 March 1984 the third respondent (hereinafter referred to as “Ncube”) who was the original owner sold the property to the Musemburis. In June 1985 he purported to cancel the said agreement of sale on account of breach by the Musemburis. On 31 October 1985, in case number .M19592/85 the Musemburis applied in the magistrates’ court for an order to compel Ncube to sign all documents necessary for the transfer of the property to them. On 17 July 1986 the Musemburis’s application was dismissed on account of their default. They applied for rescission of judgment on 27 November 1986 and that application was also dismissed because they were again in default. They then appealed to the Supreme Court against the dismissal of their application for rescission of judgment. In case number. HC
 1182/86 Ncube instituted proceedings for the eviction of the Musemburis. Default judgment was entered, but was subsequently set aside. On September 5, 1988 Ncube entered into an agreement of sale with Tshuma over the same property. A Deed of Transfer was registered in favour of Tshuma on 5 April 1089. Tshuma then instituted proceedings for an order that Ncube grant him vacant possession of the property. CHIDYAUSIKU J issued an order evicting Ncube and all those claiming through him from the property but execution was stayed pending judgment in HC 1182/86. The two cases were then consolidated. The matter proceeded to trail before MTAMBANENGWE J who granted absolution from the instance on 10 June 1992.

Following that development, the Musemburis then applied for an order canceling transfer of the property to Tshuma and directing him to transfer the property to them. That application was withdrawn by consent and the Musemburis agreed to pay the costs. Tshuma then instituted the present case on 8 February 1994 claiming the eviction of the Musemburis and payment of holding over damages. He obtained a default judgment which was subsequently set aside in case number HC 3065/94. The Musemburis then filed their opposing papers and a counter-claim on 1 August 1994 and Tshuma filed his replication and plea in reconvention on 26 September 1994. On 5 October 1994 the Musemburis applied to join Ncube and the Registrar of Deeds and the application was granted on 14 December 1994. On 8 June 1995 CABS issued summons against Tshuma seeking to foreclose and judgment against Tshuma was obtained on 27 December 1996. CABS then applied to be joined as a party to this case. Tshuma filed an amended plea on 31 January 1997 and an order was granted joining CABS on 3 February 1997. The Musemburis then undertook to pay what was due to CABS. Issues pertaining to whether the matter was prescribed and whether the matter was *res judicata* arose. Both Tshuma and Ncube had pleaded that the claim in reconvention by the Musemburis seeking an order directing the Registrar of Deeds to transfer the property into their name was bad in law because their claim was prescribed and that the matter was *res judicata*. The matter proceeded for argument and determination before SMITH J on 16 May 2001 where the application was dismissed.

The following issues agreed to by the parties at the pre-trail conference fall for determination.

1. Whether or not the plaintiff is the owner of subdivision B of lot 257, Highlands Estate of Welmoed, known as 18 Ridgeway South Highlands;


2. Whether the occupation by the defendants is lawful;
3. Whether in purchasing the property from Ncube, the plaintiff was fully aware that the property had been sold to the defendants, and proceeded to take transfer recklessly;
4. Whether the plaintiff has suffered any damages by reason of the defendants’s occupation, if so, the quantum of damages; and
5. Whether the defendants’s agreement of sale with Ncube remained of force and effect and enforceable by the defendants at the time the plaintiff acquired the property.

Tshuma gave evidence in support of his case. He said that he entered into an agreement of sale concerning the property with Ncube on 5 September 1988. He made mortgage bond arrangements with CABS and secured the property and a Deed of Transfer was registered in his name on 5 April 1989. He said he bought the house after he had viewed it in the company of Ncube. Ncube told him that there were people who were in occupation and were his tenants for three years but were failing to pay rent. Ncube further told him that he had wanted to sell them the house but that they had failed to pay the price. He said he had cancelled the agreement of sale and that the tenants were going to leave. After satisfying himself that everything was in order he then proceeded to purchase the property. Tshuma further told the court that he was shown a letter of cancellation of the agreement by Ncube. He also said that he had sought services of legal practitioners in order to evict the tenants. Tshuma said he instituted proceedings for eviction of the Musemburis and Ncube in 1989. He obtained judgment against them but execution of the judgment was stayed pending judgment in another case. The two matters were later consolidated and came to trial before MTAMBANENGWE J, who granted absolution from the instance in favour of the Musemburis. He said he then instituted these proceedings soon thereafter.

Tshuma told the court that the Musemburis had no right to occupy his property since he bought it and had paid in full and the property was registered in his name. He also said he was also paying the rates. He denied suggestions made in cross examination that he bought the property in the full knowledge that it had been bought by the Musemburis. He stressed that he was only told that the people occupying the property were tenants. He dismissed arguments that he had given contradictory evidence in the trial before MTAMBANENGWE J and this court. He claimed that he may have been misunderstood since he spoke in a language which was not his mother language in the MTAMBANENGWE J trial. Besides his prayer for eviction Tshuma said he was claiming $1 366 863-00 for the rates he paid and $227 623 150-00 as holding over damages.

The court’s view is that Tshuma gave his evidence fairly well considering the length of time this matter had taken to come to trial. He was not shaken in cross examination. He remained calm and consistent despite the firm views he expressed on the ownership of the property and what he viewed as unfairness in having the Musemburis continue to occupy the same.

Mr. Venturas, who is a senior partner at Byron Venturas & Company, gave evidence in support of Tshuma. He said he had prepared a schedule of rate payments Tshuma had made to the City of Harare. He had prepared the schedule from printouts and invoices which had been provided by Council. He had done this together with Tshuma’s accountant. The schedule which was produced in court indicated that Tshuma had paid a total of $1 366 863-00 in rates over the period of time in question.

Mr. Mlauli Mpofu who is a registered estate agent also gave evidence in support of the rentals being claimed as holding over damages by Tshuma. He said he had done an appraisal of the property and had come up with the figure of $1 078 497 950-00 as the appropriate rentals which should have been paid for the period from 2000 to 2007.

Tendai Musemburi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tendai”) gave evidence in support of the Musemburis case. He told the court that he and his brother, the first defendant, decided in 1984 to purchase a retirement home for their retiring parents. On 11 March 1984 they entered into an agreement of sale with Gabriel Real Estate, who was acting on behalf of Ncube, and purchased the property in question. The agreement was in writing but was not signed. In terms of a schedule attached to the agreement, the purchase price was $28 500-00 and date of occupation was 1 March 1984. The method of payment was as follows:

1. an initial deposit of $3 000-00 to be paid in cash on the signing of this agreement to Gabriel Real Estate (Pvt) Ltd and to be released to the seller immediately;;
2. a further deposit in the sum of $2 000-00 to be paid in cash to Gabriel Real Estate (Pvt) Ltd by no later than close of business on Thursday 31 May 1984: to be released to the seller immediately;
3. a further deposit in the sum of $2 125-00 to be paid in cash to Gabriel Real Estate (Pvt) Ltd by no later than close of business on Tuesday 31 July 1984 and to be released to the seller immediately; and;
 4. the balance in the sum of $21 375-00 to be paid partly by monthly instalments of $400-00 commencing 1 March 1984 in reduction of outstanding capital and interest, and the remainder in full by no later than close of business on 31 March 1985.

Tendai said they paid the following amounts, $300-00 on 20 January 1984, $1 975-00 on 30 July 1984, $425-00 on 4 June 1984, $916-00 on 5 September 1984 and $1 209-00 on 1 October 1984, making a total of $7 125-00 by 1 October 1984. Tendai said Ncube, who had been out of the country, returned on 13 April 1985. He said Ncube gave them an extension of two months up to 13 June 1985. They failed to pay in terms of the agreement from the month of July to October 1984. This was because they did not have money during that time. Ncube did not raise the matter concerning the delay. They also failed to pay the amount of $21 375-00 which was supposed to have been paid by 31 March 1985. The $400-00 monthly payments which required to have been paid by 31 March 1985 were paid late as well. They got a letter from Scanlen & Holderness, who were acting for Ncube in November 1984 complaining about the delay. After receiving the letter of complaint they paid on 10 December 1984. Meantime they had applied to CABS for mortgage finance in order to fund the required balance of the purchase price. They got a letter from CABS on 7 January 1985 which indicated that they only qualified for an amount of $18 525-00 because of their earning bracket. They did not advise Ncube of this development as they wanted to reapply for the coming year since they had up to 31 March to finalize all payments. They continued to negotiate with Ncube for an extension of time. It was Tendai’s evidence that they got a further extension from Ncube up to 13 July 1985. Tendai said they got a mortgage bond on 12 July 1985. They were informed by CABS on that day that they had been granted mortgage facilities. They had been granted a mortgage bond of $19 874-00, which left them with a shortfall of $2 824-00. They took the CABS letter to a Mr Tanser of Scanlen & Holderness, who advised them to take it to Gabriel Real Estate, which they did. They were surprised to be advised by Mr Gabriel that Ncube had written to him advising that the sale agreement had been cancelled. Ncube had written his letter on 11 July 1985. This meant that Ncube had cancelled the agreement just a day before CABS had granted them mortgage facilities. Tendai told the court that in his letter of 11 July 1985, Ncube referred to his letter to Mr Gabriel of 20 June 1985. Tendai suggested to the court that Ncube did not write the 20 June letter because the signatures in the said letter and the 11 July letter were different and also that the 20 June letter did not get to Mr Gabriel. Further Tendai said they were not advised of the cancellation. He told the court that the agreement between them and Ncube was binding as the purported cancellation was not valid. He also stated that they met all their obligations in terms of the agreement. Tendai further stressed that there were two letters which were purported to had been written by Ncube on 11 July 1985. One was written from Bulawayo and the other on a Harare Housing and Community Services Department letterhead. It was his suggestion that the one on a Harare letterhead was generated after the one written from Bulawayo. The dates on the two letters were false and the two letters were written after 12 July 1985. The letter of 11 June did not bear a date stamp. Dates were manipulated to make it appear as if the letter of cancellation was written before the letter offering transfer was written on 12 July 1985. The letter of 20 June 1985 and the letter of 11 July 1985 written from Bulawayo were both tempered with or manipulated. It was therefore his view that the agreement was still binding. In pursuance of this, they instituted proceedings in the magistrate’s court demanding transfer in case number M 19592/85. The case was dismissed because their lawyers failed to attend court. They later appealed to the Supreme Court where their matter was dismissed. Thereafter there was a series of court actions and applications by all the parties involved in the matter culminating in this matter.

Tendai told the court that he knew for the first time that Tshuma had bought the same property on 18 April 1989 when Tshuma came to the property in the company of about six of his friends and advised that he had bought the property. He wanted them out of the property. He said they did not know Tshuma before.

Tendai also told the court that he knew that the property was registered in the name of Tshuma, but believe that he was not a bona fide purchaser because he did not view the house when he bought it and was aware that they had bought the property first. He added that they had not paid the balance of $21 375-00, which they intended to cover with a mortgage bond which they had secured. He however said the balance was finally paid in 1994 when a total of $60 000-00 was paid through their lawyers. Tendai said that if the court finds the agreement they entered into with Ncube to be alive, they were to pay Ncube something like $240 000-00 in full and final settlement of what was due.

In response to questions by the court Tendai agreed that that they were supposed to have completed payments by 31 March 1985, and that Ncube had several opportunities to cancel the agreement for breach of contract but he did not, instead he gave them extensions on more than two occasions.


Tendai told the court that when they bought the house it was in a bad shape and was in a state of disrepair. In his own words, it was a squatter’s paradise. They renovated the house extensively. He said they spend some ten months doing the repairs. He also said they were paying rates as well as Tshuma. They had started paying rates from March 1984. He was aware that there was an anomaly in that both parties were paying rates. He agreed with the figure Tshuma was claiming for rates.

The court was of the impression that Tendai seemed not to have been on the ground in as far as the daily events in this case were concerned. He told the court at one stage that his brother, the second defendant was more involved directly on a day to day basis. He said he was frequently out of town during that time. His evidence therefore was compromised by the fact that in some cases he was not directly involved. He appeared to be inconsistent whenever he was asked probing questions. He also made some suggestions which were clearly not backed by facts, and were mere conjecture and speculation. His suggestion that the letters of 11 July 1985 and 20 July 1985 written by Ncube were manipulated is an example. The court also observed that Ncube did not give evidence. Mr. Gabriel who is a crucial witness in this case did not give evidence as well. Ncube’s evidence was crucial in establishing whether the agreement between him and the Musemburis was properly cancelled. Mr Gabriel’s evidence was necessary in clarifying what went on between Ncube and the Musemburis particularly around 11 July and 20 July 1985, for that is the time when the letter of cancellation was written and CABS offered the Musemburis mortgage facilities.

I now turn to consider whether or not the occupation of the property by the Musemburis is unlawful, whether or not the agreement of sale between the Musemburis and Ncube still subsists and whether or not in purchasing the property from Ncube, Tshuma was aware that the property had been sold to the Musemburis.

It is common cause that Tshuma is the registered owner of the property and that the Musemburis are in occupation thereof as a result of them having also purchased the same but did not get transfer. The Musemburis have an onus to show that they are in lawful occupation of the property and also that the agreement they entered into with Ncube is still valid. They also have to prove that any right they may have in terms of the agreement of sale takes precedence over the clear undoubted right of ownership by Tshuma.


The law governing double sales is well established. It was set out by Professor McKerron in (1935) 4 SA Law Times178 and repeated with approval by Professor Burchell in (1974) 91 SALJ

“It is submitted that where A sells a piece of land to B and then to C and the position is the same mutatis mutandis in the case of a sale of a movable property of which the court would decree specific performance the rights of the parties are as follows:

1. ….

2. Where transfer has been passed to C, C acquires an indefeasible right if he had no knowledge, either at the time of sale or at the time he took transfer of the prior sale to B, and Bs only remedy is an action for damages against A. If, however, C had knowledge at either of the said dates, B, in the absence of special circumstances affecting the balance of equities, can recover the land from him, and in that event C s only remedy is an action for damages against A.”

The question then is whether Tshuma had knowledge at the time of sale or at the time he got transfer that the property had been bought by the Musemburis. Tshuma told the court that when he bought the property in 1988, the sale to the Musemburis had been cancelled and was shown a letter of such cancellation by Ncube. He said Ncube referred to the Musemburis as his tenants whom he was evicting for not paying rent. It seems to me that whether he was gullible or not in believing Ncube as he did, Tshuma s belief was bona fide and reasonable. I am of the view that it is most improbable that Tshuma would have bought a property which was riddled with problems if he had known the full facts. I see no reason why he would tie down his money to such a deal. I accept his evidence that he genuinely believed that the Musemburis, as tenants would be evicted. This is supported by the action he took soon after purchasing the property to evict the Musemburis and Ncube from the property. It is therefore my view that Tshuma had no specific knowledge that the Musemburis had bought the property in question.

I now turn to consider whether or not the agreement of sale between the Musemburis and Ncube was validly cancelled. It is common cause that the Musemburis had problems in the payment of the purchase price in terms of the agreement. Most of the payments they managed to pay were made late in contravention of the clear provisions of the agreement. They concede that Ncube had several occasions to cancel the agreement on account of their breach, but chose not to. They still have not paid more than half the purchase price. The balance remained unpaid on 12 June 1985, which was the extended deadline they were given by Ncube. The Musemburis claimed that they were granted a mortgage bond on 12 July 1985. That document, from CABS, was not produced in court throwing into doubt the correctness of the date. I agree with submissions made on behalf of Tshuma that in the light of the 20 June 1985 letter, Scanlen & Holderness had no authority to offer transfer to the Musemburis. It follows that if the Musemburis cannot show that the letter of 20 June 1985 is not genuine, they cannot prove that the agreement was not validly cancelled. The Musemburis problem is exacerbated by the fact that Ncube chose not to come to court. The situation would certainly have been clearer had Ncube given evidence in this court. In a desparate attempt to prove that the agreement was still valid, Tendai ventured into speculation, by saying that the letter in question was written on some later date in an attempt to show that the agreement had been cancelled before the letter of 12 July 1985. Tendai’s reason for so speculating is that the letter does not bear the date stamp of Gabriel Real Estate. I was made to understand that the letter referred to was a copy which was meant for court purposes only and therefore did not have a date stamp.

Even if one would assumed that I was not correct in holding the agreement was cancelled after receipt of the letter of 12 July 1985 from Scanlen & Holderness, such cancellation would have been proper because the Musemburis did not pay the amount of money requested in that letter. It is settled law that to qualify for an order of specific performance, one must show that they have performed their part of the bargain. It is common cause that the Musemburis did not perform their part of the deal, hence the agreement was cancelled.

It was submitted on Tshuma’s behalf that even if this court were to find that the Musemburis had proved that their agreement with Ncube was not validly cancelled and that Tshuma had no bona fide and reasonable belief that it had been validly cancelled the court had a discretion not to order specific performance. It was submitted that the balance of equities favoured Tshuma. I agree with that proposition. Not only would problems arise in unscrambling the transaction, but Tshuma would be unable at this late stage to claim damages from Ncube. Tshuma had paid the purchase price in full at a higher price for the property than the Musemburis were required to pay while the Musemburis have only paid about half the required price yet they have had the benefit of occupation of the property for 25 years. Further, as soon as Tshuma knew that he was not going to get vacant possession, he instituted proceedings in case number. 2026/89 whereas the Musemburis knowing that he had taken transfer of the property in 1989, took no action against him until they filed their counter claim in this matter in 1994. Had they not defaulted all along, the dispute over the cancellation of the agreement with Ncube would have been resolved before 1988 when Tshuma bought the property.

I am satisfied that these are material considerations which constitute special circumstances affecting the balance of equities. In light of these circumstances, I conclude that the applicant has discharged the onus of proving that this is not a case in which specific performance should be ordered. Added to that is the fact that this is a long drawn matter. Parties have been in and out of courts since the 1980s. It is, no doubt in the interests of all parties to achieve finality in all the litigation.

Accordingly, it is my considered view that justice in this matter would be better served if the following order is made. It is ordered as follows:

1. That the plaintiff’s claim for the eviction of the defendants and all those claiming occupation through them be and is hereby granted with costs.
2. That the counter claim by the defendants for the cancellation of the transfer of the property to Tshuma and that he should transfer the property to them be and is hereby dismissed.
3. That due to the length of time the case has taken to be concluded, and in particular, the pecuniary impact to all the parties, there be no order as to damages and the payment of rates.

*Gill, Godlonton & Gerrans*, plaintiff’s legal practitioners
*Kadandara, Mhiribidi & Chihengo*, defendants’ legal practitioners
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